The pressure to meet/beat analysts' expectations is often blamed for the recent onslaught of accounting scandals. We investigate changes in the meeting/beating phenomenon post-scandals and find that the stock market premium to meeting or just beating analyst estimates has disappeared while the premium to beating by a larger margin has diminished. In the postscandals period, managers tend to meet or just beat analysts' forecasts less often. Further, managers rely less on income-increasing discretionary accruals and more on earnings guidance. Consistent with lower earnings management, the relation between meeting/beating and future operating performance has increased post-scandals, suggesting that the decline in market premium is possibly unwarranted.
However, Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) interviewed by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (GHR 2005) opine that in the post-scandals period, capital markets continue to be obsessed with meeting and beating analysts' EPS targets and CFOs take potentially value-destroying actions to meet such expectations. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) argue that 1) the pressure to meet analyst expectations was the driver behind the accounting shenanigans of the early 2000's and;
2) SOX cannot effectively improve financial reporting transparency unless managers deemphasize earnings guidance to equity analysts as pressure to meet such guidance leads to earnings management.
We provide evidence of changes, post-scandals, 1) in the stock market's reaction to firms' meeting or beating such analyst earnings forecasts; and 2) on firms' reliance on earnings and expectations management to beat these targets. For estimation purposes, we isolate the period during which the majority of the scandals (including Enron) broke and major legislation such as SOX passed (labeled the "scandals period", defined as Q3: 2001 through Q4: 2002) and focus on a comparison between the periods before (the "pre-scandals period") and after (the "post-scandals period") this interval.
We find that the stock market premium assigned to meeting or just beating analyst estimates of quarterly earnings (defined as beating by a cent per share or less-"the small beaters") has disappeared in the post-scandals period while the premium assigned to beating expectations by more than a cent per share ("the big beaters") has diminished. These results are consistent with the market becoming more skeptical of firms that meet or beat expectations in the aftermath of the accounting scandals.
We also examine the extent to which the scandals and subsequent regulatory changes have impacted managers' actions to avoid missing analysts' expectations. We find that the proportion of firms that beat expectations by one cent or less has decreased post-scandals, after controlling for macro-economic variables and the trend in meeting or beating over time.
Moreover, the mix of mechanisms employed to meet or beat earnings benchmarks -earnings management and earnings guidance -has also changed post-scandals. While managers' propensity to rely on income-increasing discretionary accruals to meet analyst forecasts has decreased, downward expectations management has increased. This result is consistent with 1) managers moving away from earnings management, perhaps due to the increased scrutiny on such behavior and; 2) relying more on expectations management, suggesting that managers continue to be concerned with beating analysts' EPS expectations.
The decline in earnings management to meet or beat expectations in the post-scandals period raises questions about the impact of this decline on earnings quality. One possibility is that managers use discretion in accruals to signal their private information and that curbing earnings management reduces their ability to communicate this information via meeting/beating behavior (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1986 , Sankar and Subramanyam 2001 , Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2006 . Alternatively, managers may use earnings management for "opportunistic" reasons and reducing this behavior would increase the predictive ability of meeting/beating to convey information about future earnings. We investigate this question by examining the relation between meeting or beating expectations and future operating cash flows.
Results show that, post-scandals, meeting/beating expectations is more positively related to future cash flows, which is consistent with the reduction in earnings management improving the quality of the meet/beat "signal" (defined as the association between this signal and future operating performance). Hence, the reduction in the market premium associated with meeting or beating expectations does not appear to be due to a decrease in the information communicated in the meet/beat signal about future performance but rather, is possibly due to increased (and unwarranted) investor skepticism about firms that meet or beat expectations.
We find at least three developments of interest to governance advocates and regulators.
First, the proportion of small EPS beats has fallen post-scandals and the propensity to engage in income-increasing earnings management in order to meet or beat earnings benchmarks has declined. Second, this decline has led to meeting or beating being a stronger signal of future operating performance. Third, the stock market premium assigned to small beats has disappeared in the post-scandals period, which may, over time, reduce the pressure on managers to meet analyst expectations. However, our evidence suggests that expectations management to meet/beat analyst-set targets has increased in the post-scandals period. 1 Thus, it appears that some managers continue to view meeting/beating analyst expectations as important and have, perhaps, replaced earnings management with expectations management.
1 On a related note, Chen, Matsumoto and Rajgopal (2006) find that only 96 firms publicly renounced quarterly EPS guidance between 10/2000 to 01/2006. Our paper is related to an emerging literature on the post Enron climate on firms'
financial reporting practices, with the majority concentrating on the impact of SOX. Cohen, Dey and Lys (2005) find that earnings management, in general, declined after the passage of SOX but do not examine earnings management to meet/beat expectations specifically. Lobo and Zhou (2006) show that accounting conservatism increased in the post-SOX period while Jain and Rezaee (2004) find no such change. In a related working paper, Bartov and Cohen (2006) find that accounting earnings management and expectations management has declined post SOX but real earnings management has remain unchanged.
Numerous academic studies have documented various aspects of the meeting/beating expectations phenomenon prior to the recent scandals but conclusions from these studies may no longer be applicable in the post Enron world. One line of research finds an increasing propensity for firms to report profits that exactly meet or slightly beat analyst estimates (e.g., Brown 2001; Brown and Caylor 2005) . Researchers have also shown that in the pre-scandals world, managers relied extensively on accruals (e.g., Kasznik 1999, Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004) and expectations management (e.g. Matsumoto 2002; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006) to meet or beat analyst forecasts while we document that the emphasis on both tools has shifted in the post-scandals period. Finally, Bartov et al. (2002) show that meeting/beating expectations is a signal of better future performance. We find that this mapping between meeting/beating and future performance has increased post-scandals.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional background.
Section 3 presents our analysis of the stock market reaction to meeting/beating analysts' expectations. Section 4 presents our analysis of managers' actions to meet/beat expectations. In Section 5 we discuss the link between our two findings and discuss possible explanations.
Section 6 concludes.
Institutional background

Enron's fall and loss of investor trust
In October 2001, Enron announced a $1 billion non-recurring charge for accounting "errors," triggering a chain of events that eventually led to the demise of both the company and its external auditor, Arthur Andersen. Regulators, business leaders and academics have argued that the Enron scandal and the subsequent investigations left investors distrustful of the financial reporting process (Nanda 2003) . The watchdog systems designed to protect investors failed and that failure extended to investment bankers, auditors, regulators and business leaders in general, few of whom acted to prevent the actions that led to Enron's fall (Healy and Palepu 2003) . Jensen (2006) attributes these scandals to a breakdown in the integrity of corporate managers. Thus, investors are likely more skeptical of the integrity of published financial reports since the demise of Enron.
Structural reforms post Enron
Brickey (2004) Bhattacharya, Groznik and Haslem (2002) find no evidence of a stock market reaction to the first set of CEO and CFO certification of financial statements.
This paper examines a specific aspect of these changes in the financial reporting environment -namely the impact on meeting or beating expectations. Prior studies suggest that the market rewards firms that meet or beat analysts' expectations (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002) . In addition, several papers (e.g., Jensen et al. 2004 and GHR 2005) have suggested that 1) managers worry considerably about the stock market impact of failing to meet/beat analysts' expectations and 2) managers' efforts to meet or beat analyst earnings expectations were the driving force behind the accounting scandals. Hence, we examine changes in the stock market perception of meeting/beating analysts' expectations as well as changes in earnings and expectations management to avoid missing analysts' targets. Our analysis compares the pre-scandals period to the post-scandals period. The scandal period itself is relatively short (six quarters) and marked by significant upheaval in the capital markets. Thus, we do not interpret the results for this scandal period. 
Time periods examined
Research question
Our first research question relates to the stock market reaction to meeting or beating analysts' expectations. Over the past decade, numerous studies suggest that meeting or exceeding analysts' expectations has become increasingly important to managers (e.g., Brown
2001, Matsumoto 2002, Brown and Caylor 2005) . Prior studies have found evidence that the market assigns a premium to firms that meet or beat analyst expectations even after controlling for the news in earnings (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002) and that there is a market penalty to missing expectations for high growth firms (Skinner and Sloan 2002 On the other hand, the structural reforms following the scandals made numerous changes to the reporting environment aimed at curtailing managerial misbehavior. If investors view these changes as effective, it is possible that investors perceive meeting or beating analysts' forecasts as less likely to involve managerial intervention, thereby resulting in an increase in the stock market premium. Prior research provides mixed results regarding the market's reaction to the passage of SOX. Thus, whether the stock market premium to meeting or beating expectations has increased or decreased post-scandals is an empirical question.
Empirical tests of market reaction
To test our first research question, we estimate the following specification in three time periods: the pre-scandals period, the scandals period and the post-scandals period. BIGBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if actual earnings exceeds F last by more than one cent per share. Thus, SMBEAT (BIGBEAT) is a dummy variable that is set to one if 0 ≤ EPS-F last ≤ 0.01 (EPS-F last > 0.01). We do not sub-divide BIGBEATs into more sub-categories (i.e., beats of two cents, three cents, etc.) because we are primarily interested in managers' incentives, on the margin, to scramble for the last cent to meet or beat estimates. Such behavior is often the topic of extensive discussion in the academic literature (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002 , Brown and Caylor 2005 , Jensen et al. 2004 ) and in the financial press (e.g. Morgensen 2004 ).
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In equation (1) while the mean (median) UEPS is -0.002 (0.000). 17.8% of firm-quarters meet or beat analyst forecasts by a cent or less (SMBEAT) and 50.6% beat expectations by more than one cent (BIGBEAT).
Results of estimating equation (1) are reported in column (1) of Table 2 . All t-statistics reported in the paper are computed using clustered White standard errors to correct for possible serial and cross-sectional correlations (Petersen 2007) . In particular, to adjust for both serial and greater number of firms where UEPS is a cent or more. Untabulated results are insensitive to redefining SMBEAT (BIGBEAT) as a beat ≤ 2 cents per share (> 2 cents per share). On a different design related point, note that we use the most recent individual analyst forecast made three days prior to the earnings announcement rather than the most recent consensus forecast to be consistent with prior research (Bartov et al. 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005) . Our main inferences are insensitive to using consensus forecasts. 6 We start our sample period in 1987 despite the fact that the importance of meeting or beating analysts' expectations, arguably, began in the mid to late 1990's. We do this mainly to allow comparability with prior studies (Bartov et al. 2002) . However, Brown and Caylor (2005) report that the cumulative abnormal return for avoiding negative earnings surprise in the 1996-2002 period is higher than that of [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] We test the sensitivity of our results to including the earlier years. We obtain similar results if we begin our sample period in 1996.
cross-sectional correlation, we cluster the standard errors both by firm (for serial correlation) and by quarter (for cross-sectional correlation).
Column (1) suggests that the stock market used to assign a 2.5% (7.2%) premium for SMBEAT (BIGBEAT) events in the pre-scandals period. This premium has declined for both
SMBEATs ( fact that the stock market premium assigned to "small" beats has disappeared in the post-SOX period while the premium assigned to "big" beats has not may be due to the fact that the market suspects firms who just meet the forecast have indulged in earnings or expectations management to beat the target (versus firms that beat their analyst-set target handily).
We test the sensitivity of our results to several alternative explanations:
7 As an aside, it is worth noting that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) has increased considerably in the postScandals period (the coefficient on POST*UEPS is 1.78, t-statistic = 7.19). Untabulated analyses reveal that a key reason for the higher ERC in the post-Scandals period is the significant fall in interest rates. In particular, a regression of the 10-year treasury bill rate (expressed in percentages and measured at quarterly intervals) on SCA and POST and an intercept reveals a negative coefficient of -2.803 on POST (t-statistic = -7.13).
1) Same firms:
To ensure that the reduced rewards to SMBEAT and BIGBEAT are not driven by firms entering or leaving the sample across the time periods (either because of IPOs, delistings or changes in analyst coverage), we imposed a filter whereby we retain the same set of firms throughout the 1987:Q1 to the 2006:Q2 time periods. Results are inferentially similar.
2) Non-linear ERC: We allow the ERC to be non-linear by interacting UEPS with LIN, a variable that assumes values from 0 to 4, based on quintile ranks, per quarter, of absolute value of UEPS as recommended by Bartov, Lynn and Ronen (2001) in equation (1). Again, our results are inferentially similar.
3) Control for dispersion: Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin (2002) argue that a SMBEAT event is a bigger (smaller) surprise if the dispersion of earnings forecasts surrounding the earnings announcement is low (high). Hence, the market reward to a SMBEAT is expected to be larger for less dispersed earnings forecasts. We compute the dispersion of each analysts'last forecast made prior to the earnings announcement and include such dispersion as an independent variable in equation (1) and as an interaction variable with SCA and POST. We continue to observe a lower stock market premium for SMBEAT and BIGBEAT in the post-scandals period.
4) Growth expectations:
During the stock market bubble, growth expectations implicit in stock prices were likely high and the scandals occurred relatively soon after the stock market bubble burst. Therefore, the decline in premium could potentially reflect the effect of such reduced growth expectations. To address this concern, we use the book-to-market ratio measured at the end of the quarter (BMR) as a proxy for future growth expectations and interact it with UEPS.
(Note that prior research suggests that ERCs are greater for high growth firms (Collins and Kothari 1989) . The unreported results are substantially similar to those reported in the Table 2 .
However, we acknowledge that incorporating revisions in growth expectations in an ERC specification is difficult and to the extent the variation in BMR does not capture such revisions, our results could reflect disappointed growth expectations.
9
Finally, we also analyze changes in the market reaction to missing analysts' expectations.
To examine the market reaction to large and small misses, we estimate the following regression: Table 2 . The penalty for missing analysts' expectations by a penny falls from -0.060 to -0.039 between the pre-and post-scandals period (the coefficient on POST*SMMISS = 0.021, tstatistic = 2.46) while the penalty to missing by more than one cent falls from -0.059 to -0.027
(the coefficient on POST*BIGMISS = 0.032, t-statistic = 9.73). In both periods, the penalty to BIGMISS is not larger than the penalty to SMMISS, suggesting that the market equally penalizes firms for both large and small misses.
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In summary, our results are consistent with the stock market being less enamored of firms that meet or beat analysts' expectations, particularly those that exactly meet or just beat those 9 It is also possible that omitted concurrent macro-economic shocks affect the market's perception of meet-beat behavior and hence potentially account for our results. We consider several potentially confounding macroeconomic variables: 1) percentage change in seasonally adjusted GDP over the previous quarter, obtained from the Federal Reserve Board (available at www.federalreserve.gov); 2) two-digit SIC code based industry ROA for the quarter; 3) annual interest rates for a 10-year T-Bill measured at quarterly intervals obtained from the Federal Reserve Board website; 4) stock market risk premium, measured as return on the market net of risk free rate, to account for the overall market being under or over valued; 5) exchange rate index for U.S. dollars against a basket of currencies to provide for the weak U.S dollar environment; and 6) stock return volatility of the daily returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index. In particular, we introduce these six variables as independent variables by themselves and as interactions with POST and SCA. Despite these controls, we find that the stock market rewards for BIGBEAT and SMBEAT have declined in the post-Scandals period. While we cannot rule out the possibility that another concurrent macro-economic event accounts for the reduced premium to meeting/beating expectations, the fact that our results are robust to the inclusion of numerous macro-economic factors provides us some reassurance that our results are not spurious.
forecasts. The results also suggest that the market appears to be more forgiving of firms that miss expectations, particularly when they miss by a wider margin. Although we present results related to missing expectations, most of the discussion in the academic and practitioner literature tends to focus on meeting and beating expectations. Thus, we concentrate on exploring the SMBEAT and BIGBEAT results in the upcoming analyses.
Managerial Actions to Meet/Beat Analysts' Expectations
Research question
In this section, we ask whether managers' reliance on earnings and expectations management to meet or beat analyst estimates has changed in the post-scandals period. Both academic research (Cohen et al. 2005 , GHR 2005 ) and the popular press have argued that managers' costs of managing earnings via accounting techniques have increased post-scandals because of (i) increased auditor and regulator scrutiny; and (ii) more rigorous enforcement of penalties for securities violations. Moreover, our previous finding that the market premium associated with meeting or beating expectations has diminished in the post-scandals period, suggests that managers have smaller incentive to engage in meeting/beating behavior. These arguments imply that, in general, the propensity for managers to avoid missing analysts' expectations have declined in the new reporting environment.
2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; and Burgstahler and Eames 2006). 12 GHR (2005) report that
CFOs are reluctant to manage accounting earnings but are more open to expectations management in the post-scandals period. Moreover, the requirements of SOX likely curtail managerial discretion over accounting numbers. In addition, media attention surrounding the accounting scandals focused primarily on managers' use of accounting discretion to meet or beat analysts' forecasts. In contrast, neither SOX nor the media directly addresses expectations management. Thus, if managers still have some incentives to meet or beat expectations they will likely rely more on earnings guidance than earnings management to avoid missing expectations.
Empirical tests of the proportion of firms meeting/beating analysts' expectations
We examine whether the proportion of firms meeting/beating analysts' forecasts has changed in the new reporting environment. To statistically test our second hypothesis regarding temporal changes in SMBEAT% and BIGBEAT% over time, we estimate the following regression:
In equation (3), t refers to calendar quarter, Time denotes the calendar quarter number with the first quarter set at Q1:1987, GDP is the percentage change in seasonally adjusted GDP over the previous quarter, and the other variables are as defined earlier. We include TIME to control for the previously-documented increase in the propensity of firms to meet/beat analysts' expectations (Brown 2001) . GDP is added as a control variable to account for the possibility that meets-beats or misses merely reflect improved or deteriorating macro economic conditions.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the results of estimating equation (3).
Consistent with prior research, we find an overall increase in the proportion of both small and big beaters over time (coefficient on TIME is significant in both Column (1) and (2)).
However, in the post-scandals period, the proportion of small beats is an average of 10.4%
lower (coefficient on POST in column (1) = 0.104) than what would be expected given the time trend and GDP, a statistically significant decrease (t-statistic = -11.06). We also find a decrease in the propensity for big beats in the post-scandals period (β 4 in column (2) = -0.039, t-statistic = -2.43), albeit a smaller one. Although the decline in big beats is not apparent from a visual inspection of Figure 2 , the decline is significant if one considers the overall upward trend in the propensity to meet/beat expectations and the impact of GDP on the propensity to beat expectations by a wide margin (coefficient on GDP in column (2) = 2.882, t-statistic = 3.31).
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Next, we examine whether the propensity to miss expectations has changed in the new reporting environment. Table 3 suggests an increase in the 13 The inclusion of TIME in our regression assumes that the trend of increasing BIGBEATs and SMBEATs noted in prior research would have continued were it not for some structural change in the environment. However, if one believes that the expected proportion of small/big beats follows a random walk, our specification could lead to a significant coefficient on POST even if the proportion of BIGBEATs and SMBEATs remained unchanged from the latest pre-Scandals quarter (i.e., Q2:2001). To address this issue, we restricted the pre-Scandals period to the most recent 14 quarters (the same number of quarters we have post-Scandals) and re-ran our regressions excluding the TIME variable. The coefficient on POST is still significant in the SMBEAT regression (t-statistic =5.58, untabulated) but is not significant in the BIGBEAT regression. However, the combined proportion of SMBEAT and BIGBEAT is smaller post-scandals using this reduced sample (and excluding the TIME variable).
percentage of small misses in the post-scandals period (β 4 = 0.009, t-statistic = 3.16). The regression analysis also confirms the increase in big misses (β 4 = 0.136, t-statistic = 8.20).
Overall, these results are consistent with managers taking fewer managerial actions (such as managing earnings or expectations) to meet or beat analysts' earnings targets -perhaps as a result of the reduced stock market premium associated with meeting or beating expectations and the reduced penalty for missing such targets.
Empirical tests of the mix of mechanisms to beat expectations
We now investigate 1) accrual based earnings management, and 2) expectations management to meet or beat forecasts. As discussed in section 4.1, we hypothesize that increased auditor, regulator, and media scrutiny in the new reporting environment has reduced managers' ability to use accounting techniques to meet or beat expectations. We also hypothesize that the reduced discretion with respect to earnings will lead managers to rely more on earnings guidance to avoid missing expectations.
Accounting earnings management
We proxy accounting earnings management using the modified Jones (1991) model as discussed in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) , controlling for performance as in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) and potential differences in accruals during the fourth quarter (Matsumoto 2002) . It is important to adjust abnormal accruals for performance because better performance is likely related to both abnormal accruals and firms' tendency to meet or beat analyst estimates. Specifically, we estimate the following regression for each two-digit SIC code with at least 10 firms in quarter q.
, , The industry-and quarter-specific parameter estimates obtained from equation (4) are used to estimate firm-specific normal accruals (as a percent of lagged total assets): 
where NA refers to "normal" accruals and ΔAR is firm i's change in accounts receivable (Compustat #37). We calculate abnormal accruals, ABACC, in quarter q as To examine whether managers' propensity to use accounting earnings management has changed in the post-scandals period, we follow Bartov et al. (2002) and restrict our attention to firm-quarters that meet or beat expectations. For such firm-quarters we subtract ABACCPS from EPS and compute the proportion of firm-quarters that could not have met the analyst forecast but for the use of income-increasing abnormal accruals. 14 Because we restrict our attention to only those firm-quarters 1) that meet or beat analyst forecasts; and 2) for which we can estimate ABACCPS, we employ 73,780 firm-quarter observations.
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Panel A of Table 4 shows that the proportion of firms-quarters that hit analyst forecasts only with the assistance of discretionary accruals has significantly declined from 47.27% in the pre-scandals period to 42.78% in the post-scandals period ( 2 χ = 106.16, p < 0.001). The decline in the reliance of discretionary accruals applies both to SMBEATs and BIGBEATs, although the decline is greater for the SMBEAT group (decline of 8.71% for SMBEAT versus a decline of 2.89% for the BIGBEAT group).
To assess whether this percentage change withstands a more rigorous multivariate test, we define a dummy variable ACCMEET set to 1 if (EPS-ABACCPS) < F last and to zero otherwise and employ the following logistic regression: 
We include GDP and INDROA to control for the effect of economic activity on accounting earnings management to meet analyst expectations. If the univariate results hold in a multivariate setting, we expect a negative β 3 .
Column (1) of panel B of Table 4 reports the results obtained by estimating equation (6).
Consistent with our univariate results, the coefficient on POST is significantly negative (Wald 2 χ = 513.16, p < 0.001), suggesting a decline in the propensity to use income-increasing earnings management to meet or beat expectations in the post-scandals period. This coefficient translates into a 16% decrease in the probability of using upward earnings management to meet/beat analysts' expectations. 16 Column (2) refines equation (6) income increasing accruals to just meet or slightly beat expectations has declined more in the post-scandals period than the propensity to use income increasing accruals to beat expectations by a wider margin. This coefficient translates into a 5% greater decline in probability for the SMBEAT group than the BIGBEAT group,
Expectations Management
We use Matsumoto's (2002) expected forecast model based on the time-series behavior of past quarterly earnings to measure expectations management. Unlike proxies based on forecast revisions (such as that used in Bartov et al. 2002) , the Matsumoto (2002) model allows for the possibility that managers provide long-term guidance that affects the initial forecast made during the quarter. 17 The cost of using the Matsumoto (2002) (Greene 1993) . Technically, the marginal effect for dichotomous variables should be calculated as the difference in probability when the variable is equal to one versus zero, evaluated at the mean of the other variables. This procedure produces nearly identical values as those produced using the above formula. 17 Using forecast revisions during the quarter to identify firms that guide analysts' forecasts downward presumes the initial forecast is unbiased. If managers give downward biased guidance two or three quarters out, then in We compute the difference between the latest analyst forecast (F last ) and the EPS forecast for the quarter based purely on time-series behavior of past quarterly EPS realizations. 19 An actual forecast, F last , lower than what would be expected given the time-series behavior of past EPS is consistent with downward expectations management. The empirical specification to compute the abnormal or unexpected forecast of earnings per share is developed in two steps.
First, we estimate an expected forecast of EPS for the forthcoming quarter by estimating the following regression for each four-digit SIC code with at least 10 firms in quarter q:
where ΔEPS i,q is the difference between EPS for firm i in quarter q and seasonally lagged EPS for the same firm four quarters ago, and P i,q , as before, refers to stock price per share for firm i at the end of quarter q. We define the abnormal forecast (ABFRCST) as follows:
Note that a negative ABFRCST indicates that F last is lower than the predicted earnings forecast and is consistent with downward guidance. To detect "suspect firm-quarters," we identify firms that meet or beat expectations based on F last but whose actual earnings would have subsequent quarters, the initial forecast would not need to be managed downward (because it is already biased downward). The Matsumoto (2002) proxy does not assume that the first forecast of the quarter is unbiased.
fallen short of expectations were it not for the downward guidance. Data requirements result in 75,911 usable firm-quarters.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the proportion of firm-quarters that rely on expectations management in the pre-and post-scandals period. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that 7.98% of firms relied on downward guidance in the pre-SCA period whereas 10.85% of firmquarters relied on downward guidance in the post-scandals period, a significant difference ( 2 χ =146.63, p-value < 0.001). This increase is found for both the small and the big beat groups.
To assess whether these univariate results hold in a multivariate specification, we 
Reconciling changes in market reactions and changes in managerial behavior
Meeting or beating as a signal of future performance
While the stock market premium to meeting or beating analysts' expectations has diminished in the post-scandals period, the proportion of firms using accruals management to meet or beat analysts' expectations has fallen. One might expect an associated increase in the market premium to meeting or beating, if the decline in earnings management results in improved earnings quality. The decline in earnings management could also inhibit managers' ability to signal their private information about future earnings. Bartov et al. (2002) provide support for this notion as they find that firms who meet or beat expectations have higher future operating performance. 21 Alternatively, it is possible the stock market either ignores or is unaware of the increased earnings quality and penalizes a firm's tendency to meet or beat expectations in the post-scandals period.
To assess the implications of meeting/beating for earnings quality, we examine how the relation between meeting or beating expectations and future performance has changed post- We include SALES and the standard deviation of CFO (ROA) to control for the effects of size and risk on future operating performance. Lagged CFO (ROA) is included to control for potential mean-reversion in performance measures (Barber and Lyon 1996) . Industry ROA controls for industry specific shocks to future operating performance. Because we require four subsequent quarters of performance, we end our pre-and post-scandals periods four quarters earlier to ensure that our future cash flows occur in the same regime period.
If SMBEAT and BIGBEAT signal future operating performance, we expect β 6 and β 7 to be positive. If the decline in premium associated with meeting or beating expectations is an accurate reflection of the valuation implications of meeting/beating, the relation between meeting and beating earnings benchmarks and future operating performance should decline post SOX and the coefficients on POST*SMBEAT and POST*BIGBEAT (β 14 and β 15 ) should be negative. On the other hand, if the decline in earnings management increases the quality of the signal associated with meeting or beating expectations, β 14 and β 15 should be positive.
Results related to FUTCFO and FUTROA are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table   6 . Consistent with Bartov et al. (2002) , in the pre-scandals period, we find significant positive coefficients on SMBEAT and BIGBEAT in both columns (1) and (2), indicating that firms who meet or beat analysts' expectations subsequently experience higher operating performance (controlling for the total earnings news for the quarter). We also find a significant increase in the coefficients on SMBEAT and BIGBEAT in the post-scandals period when using CFO as a measure of future performance (t-statistics on POST*SMBEAT and POST*BIGBEAT in column
(1) = 2.39 and 3.14, respectively). However, we do not find a similar increase when using ROA as a measure of future performance. Thus, we find some evidence that meeting or beating expectations is a stronger signal of future operating performance in the post-scandals period, consistent with the reduced earnings management improving earnings quality. 22 These findings suggest that the smaller stock market reactions to the firms' meet-beat behavior in the postscandals period may not be justified given the corresponding improvement in earnings quality. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether the stock market's perception of meeting or beating analyst forecasts has changed in the aftermath of the accounting scandals, structural reforms 22 Findings in Bartov et al. (2002) suggest that firms that engage in earnings or expectations management in order to meet/beat expectations exhibit worse future performance than firms that meet/beat expectations "legitimately". Thus, it follows that the reduction, post-scandals, in the proportion of meet/beat firms who attain this status by using earnings management should increase the strength of the meet/beat signal for future earnings (because a greater proportion of the meet/beat firms are "legitimate" meet/beaters in the post-scandals period). However, the fact that expectations management has increased post-scandals implies the opposite -since firms who manage expectations have lower future performance and there is a greater proportion of these firms post-scandals, the relation between meeting/beating and future performance should decline. But, the decrease in earnings management is greater than the increase in expectations management and the proportion of firms that engage in neither earnings management nor expectations management increases from 48% to 52% post-scandals (untabulated). Thus, the result is a net positive effect on the quality of the meet/beat signal. 23 In untabulated analyses we find some evidence that the decline in market premium to meeting or beating analysts' expectations in the post-Scandals period varies across firms -and in a way that we might expect if the reason for the decline is heightened investor skepticism over potential "earnings games" associated with meeting/beating analysts' expectations. Firms with a history of repeated meeting/beating behavior and firms with high CEO incentive pay experience a greater decline in penalty than firms without such a history and firms with low CEO incentive pay.
following Enron and passage of SOX and whether managers have changed their behavior related to meeting or beating expectations. Results suggest that the stock market has become increasingly suspicious of firms that just meet or narrowly beat analyst forecasts. In particular, the premium assigned by the stock market to small (big) EPS beats, defined as meeting or beating analyst expectations by a mere cent per share (more than a cent) has disappeared (diminished).
We also find that the proportion of small EPS beats has fallen in the post-scandals period, suggesting that managers appear to have cut actions to exactly meet or just beat expectations. In investigating the mix between earnings and expectations management to meet or beat analyst forecasts, we find that the reliance on income-increasing discretionary accruals has declined and that managers appear to emphasize expectations management more in the post-scandals period.
Further analysis suggests that post-scandals, meeting or beating expectations has become a stronger signal of future cash flows, which is consistent with the observed decrease in the use of earnings management to meet/beat expectations. It is possible the decline in market premium associated with meeting or beating expectations is the result of increased investor skepticism that is, perhaps, unwarranted.
Overall, our results indicate that the market has become more suspicious of the actions taken by managers to avoid missing analysts' expectations and managers have responded by reducing their propensity to engage in this behavior. However, the pressure to meet analyst forecasts has not been completely eliminated, as the propensity to engage in expectations management to meet or beat the earnings target appears to have increased in the new reporting environment. In sum, the evidence suggests that Enron's legacy is a significant change in both managerial behavior and the stock market's perceptions of such behavior.
Two important caveats, however, are in order. First, it is possible that another event occurring concurrently with the scandals is the true driving force behind the changes we observe.
In particular, the stock market bubble burst shortly before the scandals and it is possible that the effects of this event are reflected in the market premium to meeting/beating expectations. This possibility is mitigated by the fact that our results are robust to allowing the coefficient on unexpected earnings to vary with firms' book-to-market ratio (a measure of growth expectations)
as well as to the inclusion of numerous controls for macro-economic factors. Nevertheless, it is impossible to completely rule out the possibility of another concurrent event driving our results.
Second, a sufficiently long period of time has perhaps not elapsed since the scandals to obtain a complete read on their impact. In particular, several structural reforms initiated in response to the scandals continue to remain work-in-progress. Hence, our results provide only early evidence on Enron's legacy on the new financial reporting environment and a more comprehensive assessment will likely have to wait until more data on such behavior becomes available in the future. Nevertheless, our evidence indicates that several important changes in the financial reporting environment have occurred since Enron. Figure 2 presents the percentage of firms meeting or beating analysts' expectations over time. SMBEAT refers to a firm that beats expectations by a cent per share or less, where expectations are defined as the last analyst forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. BIGBEAT refers to a firm that beats expectations by more than a cent per share. Figure 3 presents the percentage of firms missing analysts' expectations over time. SMMISS refers to a firm that misses expectations by a cent per share or less, where expectations are defined as the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. BIGMISS refers to a firm that misses expectations by more than a cent per share. CAR refers to cumulative market-adjusted (value weighted) abnormal return over the period beginning two days following the date of the first forecast for the quarter q made at least three days subsequent to the announcement of previous quarter's earnings (labeled "F first ") and ending one day after the release of the quarter's results. UEPS i is unexpected earnings for the quarter defined as (EPS i,q -F first )/P q-1 where EPS is the actual earnings per share number announced by the firm for the quarter and the difference between EPS and F first is scaled by P q-1 , the stock price per share at the beginning for the quarter q. SMBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm beats expectations by a cent per share or less (EPS-F last ≤ $0.01), where F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. BIGBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm beats expectations by more than a cent per share (EPS-F last > $0.01). Sales refer to the firm's natural logarithm of net sales. ROA is the firm's return-on-assets, defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets. Accruals are the difference between income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows, adjusted for extraordinary items and discontinued operations. CFO refers to the firm's operating cash flows. Both accruals and CFO are scaled by beginning total assets. Market Capitalization is the market value of equity, computed as stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. GDP is the percentage change in seasonally adjusted GDP over the previous quarter. INDROA denotes the average of quarter q ROA computed for the two digit SIC code to which firm i belongs (excluding the ROA of firm i). Adj. R-squared (%) 0.051 0.046 CAR i,q refers to cumulative market-adjusted (value weighted) abnormal return over the period beginning two days following the date of the first forecast for the quarter q made at least three days subsequent to the announcement of previous quarter's earnings (labeled "F first ") and ending one day after the release of the quarter's results. UEPS i,q is unexpected earnings for the quarter defined as (EPS i,q -F first )/P q-1 where EPS is the actual earnings per share number announced by the firm for the quarter and the difference between EPS and F first is scaled by P q-1 , the stock price per share at the beginning for the quarter q. SMBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm beats expectations by a cent per share or less (EPS -F last ≤ $0.01), where F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. BIGBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm beats expectations by more than a cent per share (EPS -F last > $0.01). SMMISS is a dummy set to one if actual earnings miss expectations by a cent per share or less ($0.00 > EPS-F last ≥ -$0.01). BIGMISS is a dummy variable set to one if actual earnings miss expectations by more than a cent per share (EPS -F last < -$0.01). SCA (POST) is a dummy variable set to one if the firm observation falls in the SCA (post-SCA) period, and zero otherwise. Small beaters (SMBEAT) are firm-quarters where actual earnings exceed expectations by a cent per share or less ($0.00 < EPS-F last ≤ $0.01), where EPS is the actual earnings per share number announced by the firm for the quarter and F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. Big beaters (BIGBEAT) are firm-quarters where actual earnings exceed expectations by more than a cent per share (EPS -F last > $0.01). Small misses (SMMISS) are firm-quarters where actual earnings miss expectations by a cent per share or less ( $0.00 > EPS-F last ≥ -$0.01), where EPS is the actual earnings per share number announced by the firm for the quarter and F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. Big misses (BIGMISS) are firmquarters where actual earnings miss expectations by more than a cent per share (EPS -F last < -$0.01). The dependent variable is the proportion of small or big beaters (missers) scaled by firms reporting earnings in a calendar quarter from 1987:Q1 to 2006:Q2 (total of 78 quarters). TIME denotes the quarter number with the first quarter set at 1987:Q1. GDP is the percentage change in seasonally adjusted GDP over the previous quarter. SCA (POST) is a dummy variable set to one if the firm observation falls in the SCA (post-SCA) period, and zero otherwise. Of the total number of firms that meet or beat expectations (EPS ≥ F last ), we report the proportion of firms that rely on accounting management to meet or beat expectations, i.e. (EPS-ABACCPS) ≤ F last for the respective time periods. EPS is the actual earnings per share number announced by the firm for the quarter. ABACCPS refers to abnormal accruals per share where abnormal accruals are calculated as per the modified Jones (1991) model estimated every quarter for a two digit-SIC code (see text). F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. SMBEAT firm-quarters are those quarters where actual earnings exceed expectations by a cent per share or less (EPS -F last ≤ $0.01); BIGBEAT firm-quarters are those where actual earnings exceed expectations by more than a cent per share (EPS -F last > $0.01). Table 4 Panel B presents the logistic regression of firms that rely on accounting earnings management to meet or beat the last analysts' forecast. Using the total number of firms that meet or beat expectations (EPS ≥ F last ), ACCMEET is a dummy variable set equal to one if (EPS-ABACCPS) ≤ F last and zero otherwise. ABACCPS refers to abnormal accruals per share where abnormal accruals are calculated as per the modified Jones (1991) model estimated every quarter for a two digit-SIC code (see text). F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. TIME denotes the quarter number with the first quarter set at 1987:Q1. SCA (POST) is a dummy variable set to one if the firm observation falls in the SCA (post-SCA) period, and zero otherwise. GDP is the percentage change in seasonally adjusted GDP over the previous quarter. INDROA denotes the average of quarter q ROA computed for the two digit SIC code to which firm i belongs (excluding the ROA of firm i). SMBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm beats expectations by a cent per share or less (EPS -F last ≤ $0.01). Dummy quarters are dummy variables for fiscal quarters Q1, Q2, and Q3. They are not presented in the table for the sake of brevity. Of the total number of firms quarters that meet or beat expectations (EPS ≥ F last ), we report the proportion of firms that rely on expectation management to meet or beat expectations, i.e. EPS ≤ (F last -ABFRCST) for the respective time periods. EPS is the actual earnings per share number announced by the firm for the quarter. ABFRCST refers to the abnormal forecast of earnings per share calculated as per the Matsumoto (2002) model estimated every quarter for a four digit-SIC code (see text). F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. SMBEAT firm-quarters are those quarters where actual earnings exceed expectations by a cent per share or less (EPS -F last ≤ $0.01); BIGBEAT firm-quarters are those where actual earnings exceed expectations by more than a cent per share (EPS -F last > $0.01). Table 5 Panel B presents the logistic regression of firms that rely on expectations management to meet or beat the last analysts' forecast. Using the total number of firms that meet or beat expectations (EPS ≥ F last ), GUIDEMEET is a dummy variable set equal to one if EPS ≤ F last -ABFRCST and zero otherwise. ABFRCST refers to the abnormal forecast of earnings per share calculated as per the Matsumoto (2002) model estimated every quarter for a four digit-SIC code (see text). F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. TIME denotes the quarter number with the first quarter set at 1987:Q1.REGFD is a dummy variable set to one for firm observations from October 2000 onwards. SCA (POST) is a dummy variable set to one if the firm observation falls in the SCA (post-SCA) period, and zero otherwise. GDP is the percentage change in seasonally adjusted GDP over the previous quarter. INDROA denotes the average of quarter q ROA computed for the two digit SIC code to which the firm i belongs (excluding the ROA of firm i). SMBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm beats expectations by a cent per share or less (EPS -F last ≤ $0.01). Dummy quarters are dummy variables for fiscal quarters Q1, Q2, and Q3. They are not presented in the table for the sake of brevity. PERF (FUTPERF) refers to (future) operating performance, measured as CFO and ROA. FUTCFO is cash flow from operations, scaled by lagged total assets, averaged over the subsequent four quarters after quarter q. FUTROA is return on assets, averaged over the subsequent four quarters after quarter q. UEPS i,q is unexpected earnings for the quarter defined as (EPS i,q -F first )/P q-1 where EPS is the actual earnings per share number announced by the firm for the quarter, F first is the first forecast for quarter q made at least three days subsequent to the announcement of the previous quarter's earnings, and the difference between EPS and F first is scaled by P q-1 , the stock price per share at the beginning for the quarter q. CFO is the previous quarter's CFO. σ CFO is the standard deviation of CFO for four quarters prior to quarter q. ROA is the previous quarter's ROA. σ ROA is the standard deviation of ROA for four quarters prior to quarter q.SALES is the natural logarithm of sales for previous quarter q-1. INDROA denotes the average of quarter q ROA computed for the two digit SIC code to which firm i belongs (excluding the ROA of firm i). SMBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm beats expectations by a cent per share or less (EPS-F last ≤ $0.01), where F last is the last forecast for the quarter made at least three days prior to the release of the earnings announcement for that quarter. BIGBEAT is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm beats expectations by more than a cent per share (EPS-F last > $0.01).
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